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THE PRIVATE PERSON'S DUTY TO ASSIST
THE POLICE IN ARREST
The Wyoming statute on the private person's duty to assist the police
in arrest provides that a fine of one hundred dollars ($100.00) may be
imposed against a citizen who, without valid cause, refuses or neglects to
aid an officer in the execution of his duty.' The common law obligation
of citizens to respond when summoned to assist in making an arrest 2 is
thus part of the statute law of Wyoming.
The ancient English law, however, required more of the citizen than
Wyoming's present statute in regard to his duty to assist in policing the
community. To make law enforcement more effective, a private person
was required by statute to provide himself, according to his wealth, with a
breast-plate of iron, a sword, a knife, and a horse, the use of which would
be at the command of the village reeve to assist him in maintaining
public order. 3
Other than Section 9-635 mentioned above, there is no legislative expression in Wyoming outlining the extent to which a private person may
be ordered to give assistance to the police. The Supreme Court of Wyoming has not interpreted the statute or otherwise passed on the question.
Statutes in most states make the refusal to assist in an arrest punishable
by fine or imprisonment. Several states have legislation comparable to
Wyoming, 4 and a number of cases arising under such statutes illustrate
the extent to which a citizen must assist an officer in the execution of
an arrest.
5
a policeman had comIn Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corporation,
mandeered the plaintiff's husband's cab and ordered the husband to chase
another automobile in order to arrest its occupant. During the chase a
collision with a trolley car caused the death of the cab driver. Death
benefits were awarded the plaintiff under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act on the premise that the defendant-employer knew or was
chargeable with knowledge that the car and driver alike would have to
respond to the call of an officer when there was need of hot pursuit.
Chief Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority of the New York Court of
Appeals stated:
Still, as in the days of Edward I, the citizenry may be called upon
to enforce the justice of the state, not faintly and with lagging
steps, but honestly and bravely and with6 whatever implements
and facilities are convenient and at hand.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-635 (1945). "Whoever, when required by any sheriff or his
deputy, or by any coroner, constable or any conservator of the peace, to assist him
in the execution of his office, or in the service of any process, refuses or neglects
to render such assistance without having a valid cause for so refusing or neglecting,
shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00)
Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History, 66 (1915).
Statute of Winchester, 1285, c. 6.
E.g., Burns Ind. Stat. § 10-1006 (1956) ; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.983 (1948) ; Baldwin's Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.32 (1953).
250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726, 61 A.L.R. 1351 (1928).
Id. at 15, 164 N.E. at 727.

NOTES

One limit has been expressed by the Alabama Supreme Court7 which
reversed a conviction for refusing to aid in an officer in making an
arrest. Here a deputy sheriff was in pursuit of a fleeing thief. The thief
ran into a store which was being tended by the defendant. The store was
crowded with persons who showed a disposition to defend and assist the
thief. The defendant refused to obey the command to assist, given by the
deputy sheriff, and was subsequently convicted for his failure to assist.
In reversing this conviction, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that the
officer's command, if followed, would have exposed the defendant to a
futile attempt. However, it is of no consequence that the action leading
to the arrest is dangerous, provided the arrest can be effected. The fact
that there is danger involved is the very thing which calls for and makes
obedience a duty.
In Wyoming a citizen must assist an officer in arrest unless he has
"valid cause" to refuse. The legislature, by the use of the words "valid
cause," has not provided the citizen a standard he may apply in determining what would relieve him of a duty to respond. To avoid an attack
that the statute is void for vagueness, the legislature should provide a guide
whereby a citizen would know, for example, if a physical disability,
reasonable apprehension of harm, or probable futlity of an attempt would
be valid cause for refusing to assist. As it now stands, its constitutionality
is open to serious question.
It is interesting to compare the crime of misprision of felony s with
the citizen's duty to do whatever is necessary to assist in arrest when properly summoned. At common law a person was punished when he, knowing
a felony to have been committed and knowing who commited it, failed to
report the crime to the proper authorities. He was punished for merely
remaining silent.9
The crime of misprision of felony and the crime of refusing to assist
an officer are comparable in that both rest on the principle of omission
to perform a duty imposed by law. But less action is demanded of the
citizen in order to avoid guilt of misprision than is required in assisting
an officer in making an arrest. One element of the crime of misprision of
felony is knowledge of the felonious act of another. Scienter is not an
element of the crime of refusing to assist an officer. It is the lawful
command of a conservator of the peace which, when ignored, brings down
the penalty upon the citizen. 10
The Wyoming statute requires a private citizen to assist an officer
12
This same language is found in Ohio legislation
when so ordered."
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Dougherty v. State, 106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 392 (1895).
Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 684, 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1952 ed.).
State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 Atl. 533 (1907).
State v. Ditmore, 177 N.C. 592, 99 S.E. 368 (1919).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-635 (1945).
Balwwin's Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.32 (1953).
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and has been interpreted as giving a law enforcement officer the right to
summon a citizen only in cases of emergency. 3
An example of an emergency is found in Mitchell v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,1 4 a case in which the court determined that a deputy sheriff
was faced with an emergency when called to arrest a drunken man who was
known to be dangerous when intoxicated. Under these circumstances the
officer was authorized to call upon another person to assist in making the
arrest. And in Blackman v. City of Cincinnati- a police officer was on
foot and the person whom he was attempting to arrest was fleeing in
an automobile. The officer ordered a bystander to assist by driving his
own car in pursuit of the fleeing person. An emergency existed, because,
without the citizen's help, the law violator would have escaped.
The Supreme Court of New York found that an officer was faced
with an emergency where those violating the public peace had dispersed
themselves, making it impossible for the officer acting alone to effect an
arrest. 16 Such an emergency warranted the summoning of a private citizen
to assist in the arrest. Similarly, an officer deemed it necessary to remove
several disorderly persons from a dance hall.17 By acting alone, the
officer in all probability would not have been able to eject the intruders,
but through the assistance of a summoned citizen, the public peace was
preserved.
It therefore appears that an officer has a right to command assistance
where an arrest could not be made by him acting alone. That the citizen is
subjected to danger appears immaterial.
However, in Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Turek' 8 a traffic patrolman asked a private citizen, Turek, to accompany him on his patrol of the
city streets. Turek joined the officer and was subsequently injured. Turek
sought damages on the theory that he had been lawfully commanded by
the officer and was therefore entitled to compensation. The court denied
his claim by asserting that the officer did not have the right to assistance
in performing routine investigative work, which the officer could have
(lone alone.
WIAhen an officer finds it necessary to rely on a private person for
assistance, no particular formality is required to place a duty on the person
to respond.'
No precise words of command are required so long as the
20
command is evident from the language employed. In State v. Bertchey
the court determined that the words "catch the thief" were sufficient to
enlist the aid of a private citizen. There is no requirement set out in the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941).
57 Ohio App. 319, 13 N.E.2d 736 (1936).
66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941).
Riker v. City of New York, 204 Misc. 878, 126 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1953).
Shawano County v. Industrial Commission, 219 Wis. 513, 263 N.W. 590 (1935).
129 Ohio St. 545, 196 N.E. 382 (1935).

19.

Supra note 17.

20.

77 N.J.L. 640, 73 Atl. 524 (1909).

NOTES

Wyoming law that a citizen must be formally and specifically called to the
assistance of the officer. By the very nature of the circumstances in which
the command is given, an officer should not be required to utter some
particular formality. The exigencies of the immediate surroundings
should dictate what is required to place a citizen under a duty to aid an
officer.
When the bystander has submitted himself to the command of an
officer to aid in making an arrest, the question arises whether a person
unlawfully arrested has a cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment against the citizen who is assisting the officer.
The question was answered in an early Vermont decision. 2 1 The court
determined that a citizen who made an illegal arrest was not liable for
false imprisonment after being commanded by an officer to make the
arrest. The defendant was required by the officer to assist him in arresting
the plaintiff for assault with the intent to commit rape. The defendant was
not at liberty to refuse, as it was his statutory duty to yield immediate
obedience. Therefore, the wrongful arrest made by the private citizen
was justified.
In a recent Oklahoma case, 22 the court said the only circumstance in
which the private citizen should be liable would be where he acts wantonly,
maliciously or beyond what he is required to do. The general rule on
23
which the Oklahoma court based its decision is stated in Firestone v. Rice,
a case in which the defendant faced charges of false imprisonment and
assault and battery as a result of obeying an order of a sheriff who acted
with an improper warrant. In finding the private citizen not liable, the
court stated that one summoned to assist is liable to imprisonment or fine
if he refuses to help and, therefore, one so summoned is not required at his
peril to ascertain whether the sheriff has a proper warrant.
There is authority contrary to the foregoing which supports the contrasting view that a citizen has no greater immunity from liability than
the officer has. The New York case of Elder v. Morrison24 followed the
theory that if the officer is a trespasser, so are those that aid him. The
court reasoned that if the officer is proceeding unlawfully, there can be no
justification for those who aid him, and since the officer had no power
to command others to do an unlawful act, they are not bound to do such an
act, and they do it at their peril.
In evaluating the relative merits of these conflicting views, we must
remember that the citizen is under a statutory duty to respond immediately to the command of an officer. The officer may issue this command
only when faced with an emergency or a situation with which he cannot
cope by himself. Under these circumstances, there is no time for the
21.
22.
23.
24.

McMahan v. Green, 34 Vt. 72 (1861).
Moyer v. Meier, 205 Okla. 405, 238 P.2d 338 (1951).
71 Mich. 377, 38 N.W. 885 (1888).
10 Wend. 128 (N.Y. 1833).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

citizen to determine whether the officer is acting unlawfully. Thus the
"assist at your own peril" rule seems unjust and therefore undesirable.
Citizens should be encouraged to co-operate in law enforcement rather than
be penalized for doing so. It is a strange legal anomaly to punish a citizen
for obeying the command of an officer, vested with lawful authority to
command, and at the same time subject him to punishment if he refuses
25
or neglects to obey.
JOHN P. MAGNUSON

CIVIL RIGHTS IN WYOMING
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the
Courtis showing heightened interest in the civil rights area. This is true
particularly in connection with the Negroid race, although not restricted
to that race.
The much publicized 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka' dealt with the admission of Negro children to a white school in
Topeka, Kansas. Three other cases, from South Carolina, Virginia and
Delaware, were consolidated with the Brown case for hearing by the
Supreme Court. In each case Negro children were denied admission to
white schools under laws requiring 2 or permitting3 school districts to
establish separate schools for Negroes. In each of the cases, except the
Delaware decision, the federal district courts had denied relief to the
parents of the Negro children under the "separate but equal" doctrine
4
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson,
which held that equality of treatment is accorded when the races are
provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be
separate. The Supreme Court of Delaware upheld that doctrine but
ordered that the children be admitted because of inequality of the
schools. 5

The Plessy case involved not education, but transportation, and the
Brown case was the first one that presented the question of whether the
doctrine should be applied to education. In denying the applicability of
the "separate but equal" doctrine, the Court stated:
In the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but
equal has not place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
6
unequal.
The Court reached this conclusion through a discussion of the develop25.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Supra note 21.
347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.
Kansas.
163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).
Supra note 1.
Supra note 1 at 347 U.S. 495.

